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Abstract 
Although relatively rare, surgical instrument retention inside a patient following Central 
Venous Catheterisation still presents a significant risk. The research presented here 
compared two approaches to help reduce retention risk: Bow-Tie Analysis and Systems-
Theoretic Accident Model and Processes. Each method was undertaken separately and then 
the results of the two approaches were compared and combined. Both approaches 
produced beneficial results that added to existing domain knowledge, and a combination of 
the two methods was found to be beneficial. For example, the bow-tie analysis gave an 
overview of which activities keep controls working and who is responsible for each control, 
and the Systems-Theoretic Accident Model and Processes revealed the safety constraints 
that were not enforced by the supervisor of the controlled process. Such two-way feedback 
between both methods is potentially helpful for improving patient safety. Further 
methodology ideas to minimise surgical instrument retention risks are also described. 
Keywords: Bow-tie, STAMP, STPA; CVC process; guidewire retention 
 
1. Introduction 
1.1 Central Venous Catheterisation 
The focus of this research was on surgical instrument retention following Central Venous 
Catheterisation (CVC). CVC is a commonly-used medical procedure to gain access to a 
patient’s venous system for a wide range of purposes such as delivering intravenous 
medication and taking measurements (Horberry, 2014).  There are more than 200,000 CVC 
insertions annually in the UK and 6 million in the USA (Sivasubramaniam and Hiremath, 
2008). However, an often overlooked potential complication is the inadvertent total loss 
intravascularly of part of the CVC set – a long, flexible, metal guidewire. Guidewire retention 
has been reported at a rate of 1 in 3,291 procedures in one medical establishment 
(Vannucci et al, 2013), although the actual incidence may be even higher due to under-
reporting (Auweiler et al, 2005; Horberry et al, 2014; Sloane, 2013; Ward et al, 2013; Ward 
et al, 2016). 
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During the CVC procedure, a small needle first enters the target vein. A flexible metal 
guidewire is inserted through the needle and into the vein, and the needle is then removed. 
With the guidewire in position, a dilator is passed over it into the vein to increase the 
diameter of the opening, and then is withdrawn. The catheter – also known as a central line 
– is then threaded over the guidewire and into the vein until the outer (proximal) end of the 
guidewire projects from the catheter. The guidewire is removed and the catheter secured 
against the patient’s skin before it is used (Horberry, 2014). 
A retained guidewire in the patient’s body may cause no overt symptoms for a prolonged 
period of time; however, in other cases, significant harm can occur, for example due to 
guidewire fracture (Guo et al, 2006; Kim et al, 2013; Pérez-Díez et al, 2007). Equally, if too 
many retained instrument events occur the risk of institutional reputation loss can be 
significant (Horberry et al, 2014; NHS England, 2015; Regenbogen et al, 2009; Sloane, 2013). 
Guidewire retention is, theoretically, a completely preventable event provided that the 
operator grips the wire at all times and then removes it. Human factors issues previously 
attributed to guidewire loss include: inexperience with the technique, lack of supervision, 
tiredness, distractions, task interruptions and a general lack of awareness of the potential 
complications in central lines amongst the health professionals (Campbell et al, 2012; 
Horberry et al, 2014; Schummer et al, 2002; Teng et al, 2014; Vannucci et al, 2012). These 
human element issues can contribute to the chances of guidewires being retained but, as 
described later in this paper, they also can offer potential points of intervention to prevent 
wire loss. 
1.2 Aims of the research 
Given that CVC is such a widely-used medical procedure and the risks of guidewire retention 
following CVC are not as low as practicable, the aim of this research was to compare two 
approaches (Bow-Tie Analysis - BTA, and Systems-Theoretic Accident Model and Processes - 
STAMP) with a view to helping to reduce retention risks. These two approaches were 
chosen because they undertake analysis at different levels: with BTA focusing on individual 
controls and STAMP focusing on systems-wide interventions. As such, it was anticipated that 
a combination of the two approaches might also offer benefits to understand and reduce 
guidewire retention risks. 
Considering BTA in conjunction with STAMP, it was anticipated that the former can give an 
overview of what activities keep a control working and who is responsible for that control. 
In turn, STAMP can reveal the safety constraints that were not enforced by the controller 
and the appropriate control actions provided but not followed. Thus, it was anticipated that 
there may be two-way feedback between the two methods. 
1.3 A systems approach to healthcare 
In accident analysis research, it is now widely accepted that failures do not just occur at a 
human level but tend to be grounded in the wider system (Hollnagel, 2004; Salmon, 2012) 
and in the interaction of the many components within such systems. A failure to consider 
the wider system can result in unfair blame to individuals (Underwood and Waterson, 2013) 
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and ineffective solutions to mitigate risk. These are both acute and long-standing problems 
in healthcare (Bagian, 2015). As a result, a number of Systemic Accident Analysis methods 
have emerged, including AcciMap (Rasmussen, 1997), STAMP (Leveson, 2004) and FRAM 
(Hollnagel, 2004). The research in this paper thus used a systems perspective to analyse the 
guidewire retention issue (Buckle et al, 2006; Clarkson et al, 2004; Horberry et al, 2014). 
Such an approach suggests that the goal is not to reduce human behaviour to rule-following, 
but to design a system in which individual responsibility and competence can effectively 
help create desired outcomes (Dekker and Leveson, 2014a).  
As an example, a flawed hospital system, rather than flawed individuals, is responsible for 
patient harm (Dekker and Leveson, 2014a). In this example, a hospital is considered as a 
dynamic and complex system and its behaviour reflects the linkages and interactions among 
the components or entities that make up the entire system (Leveson et al, 2016). Hence, a 
critical question that the systems approach pursues is not why bad operators make 
mistakes, but why good ones do (Dekker and Leveson, 2014b). Ultimately, the dichotomy 
that it is either the people or the system that cause harmful events is misleading. Instead, 
the emphasis should be on people in systems: improving the system that identifies and 
deals with professional competence from pre-medical education onwards (Dekker and 
Leveson, 2014b).  
In essence, the goal is to design systems in such a way to reduce human error (Leveson et al, 
2016). To achieve this, in the engineering domain, the type of prospective analysis required 
is called hazard analysis (Leveson et al, 2016). For this reason, this study adapts a systems-
theoretic prospective hazard analysis to a healthcare setting to identify scenarios leading to 
unwelcome situations so they can be designed (or redesigned) out of the system before 
losses occur (Leveson et al, 2016). 
 
1.4 Bow-Tie Analysis 
One of the approaches used to analyse the risk of guidewire retention following CVC was 
Bow-Tie Analysis (BTA). BTA is an increasingly popular approach often employed in high-
hazard industries such as mining and aviation (Burgess-Limerick et al, 2014; Pitblado and 
Weijand, 2014; Civil Aviation Authority, 2015). Recently, bow-ties have also been 
successfully used in medical safety (e.g., Kerckhoffs et al, 2013; Ward et al, 2016; Wierenga 
et al, 2009). Equally, BTA can show both existing controls and potential/recommended 
controls for hazards as well as highlighting where gaps in control may exist (Ward et al, 
2016). One of the particular strengths of BTA is that it provides a quickly understood 
overview of the risk controls linked to initiating events (Kirsch et al, 2012).  
BTA combines features of fault-tree and event-tree analysis to identify initiating events 
within an incident, their contributing factors and consequences, and both preventative and 
mitigating control measures (De Dianous and Fievez, 2006; Chevreau et al, 2006). As noted 
by de Ruijtera and Guldenmund (2016) and Pitblado and Weijand (2014), BTA currently lacks 
a fully consistent approach. However, at the heart of each bow-tie is an initiating event (that 
is, loss of control of the hazard leading to increased risk). In this research, the initiating 
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event is the guidewire being retained inside a patient. To the left of the initiating event the 
contributing factors and preventative controls are shown; and on the right, the mitigating 
controls and consequences are displayed (Pitblado and Weijand, 2014). 
 
1.5 A Hazard Analysis Based on the STAMP Accident Model 
STAMP (Systems-Theoretic Accident Model and Processes) is a relatively new type of 
accident model, based on systems theory rather than the traditional analytic reduction and 
reliability theory (Leveson, 2004). It mainly advocates that accidents involve a complex, 
dynamic process, meaning that they are not simply chains of component failure events. For 
this reason, and falling under the scope of the STAMP model of accident causation, safety is 
an emergent property that arises when system components interact with each other within 
a larger environment. 
In STAMP, systems are viewed as interrelated components kept in a state of dynamic 
equilibrium by feedback control loops. Figure 1 illustrates such a loop; the main elements of 
which are denoted in bold. There are four different types of element. The controller 
enforces safety constraints on other controllers, located at lower hierarchical levels, and 
ensures the safety of the system part he/she/it controls. The controller also issues 
commands to the actuator; the main responsibility (Leveson, 2011) of which is to execute 
control actions issued by the controller in order to bring the controlled process to 
equilibrium. The sensors take readings from the controlled process and feed the controller 
with data, and the controlled process is a task performed by the controller(s), either it is a 
human or an automated system.  
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Figure 1: A standard control loop and the causal factors to be considered to create accident 
scenarios (adapted from Leveson, 2011) 
 
STPA (Systems-Theoretic Process Analysis) is a hazard analysis technique that encapsulates 
the principles of the STAMP accident causality model. Because STPA is a top-down system 
engineering approach to system safety, it can be used early in the system development 
process to generate high-level safety requirements and constraints (Leveson, 2011). STPA is 
a method that identifies inadequate control actions and aims to examine scenarios or paths 
to accidents. STPA also includes those factors not included or poorly handled by the 
traditional hazard analysis methods, such as software requirements errors, component 
interaction accidents, complex human decision-making errors, inadequate coordination 
among multiple controllers, and flawed management and regulatory decision-making 
(Leveson, 2014). Within this model, safety is treated as a dynamic control problem, rather 
than a component reliability problem. 
STPA has two main stages: (1) Identify the potential for inadequate control of the system 
that could lead to a hazardous state that results from inadequate control or enforcement of 
the safety constraints; and (2) Determine how each potentially hazardous control action 
identified in the previous stage could occur. 
Page 24 of 38Risk Analysis
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
The first stage requires consideration of: (a) a control action required for safety is not 
provided or not followed, (b) an unsafe control action is provided, (c) a potentially safe 
control action is provided too early or too late, that is, at the wrong time or in the wrong 
sequence, or (d) a control action required for safety is stopped too soon or applied too long. 
The second stage may be accomplished by: (a) for each unsafe control action, examining the 
parts of the control loop (see Figure 1) to check if they could cause it and (b) considering 
how the designed controls could degrade over time, and building in protection modules. It 
should be noted, however that for a complete STPA hazard analysis intermediate steps need 
to be taken. 
 
2. Methodology 
The BTA and STAMP methods were initially undertaken separately. 
A BTA for guidewire retention inside a patient following CVC was described by Ward et al 
(2016). Full details of the method can be found in Ward et al (2016), but a summary follows.  
The paper describe how they created a list of the potential contributing factors to this 
event, and the potential consequences by reviewing the outputs from a range of methods 
previously used by the authors. These included interviews with CVC users and observations 
of catheterisations (Horberry et al, 2014). The measures which can reduce the probability of 
the guidewire being retained (preventive controls), and the measures which can be taken to 
detect the guidewire after it has been retained (mitigating controls) were then listed. Three 
members of the project team (with backgrounds in medicine, human factors and safety 
science) then created the bow-tie. Finally, this was reviewed by four medical staff who were 
familiar with the CVC process, and further iterations were made. 
For STAMP, the analysis of the system started with several meetings with clinicians in order 
to gather data and extract useful conclusions about the actual system. Once this had taken 
place, there was sufficient data for the research team to complete the STPA hazard analysis.  
 
3. Results 
3.1 Bow-tie results 
A guidewire being retained inside a patient was defined as the initiating event for the BTA. 
Figure 2 shows the potential contributing factors and consequences, and the preventive and 
mitigating controls. The BTA visually compares the current system against recommended 
changes: highlighted in grey italics are barriers that were known potential measures prior to 
the research, while those in black are possible measures that emerged through the 
research.  
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Figure 2: Guidewire retention BTA (from Ward et al, 2016) 
 
3.2. STPA Results 
As stated above, BTA in healthcare has been undertaken before, e.g. Ward et al (2016), but 
STAMP and STPA have been little used in this domain. In Section 1.5 the authors presented 
the two main stages of the STPA analysis, while in this section they elaborate more on its 
intermediate steps. Although the method is fully described from Step 1 to Step 9, the full 
results of the analysis are not presented. 
According to the STPA, accident/losses (Step 1), hazard(s) (Step 2), and system level safety 
constraints (Step 3) should be defined. Thus, for the CVC process, these three steps gave the 
following results: 
Accident or loss 
Loss of human life or deterioration of health due to a retained guidewire, 
which may fracture, cause thromboembolic complications, cause infection, or 
lead to cardiac perforation and tamponade (Peh et al, 2016). 
Hazard 
(system level) 
Retained guidewire; loss of the guidewire during procedure, or unrecognised 
failure to remove the guidewire (Amit et al, 2016). 
System safety 
constraint 
The anaesthetist shall remove the guidewire from the catheter and place it in 
the tray. 
 
Using the components of the control loop of Figure 1 as a guide, the control structure is 
created in Step 4. The safety control structure of the CVC process that STPA is performed for 
is the one in Figure 3. 
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Figure 3: Safety control structure of the CVC process. 
As shown in Figure 3, the control structure includes the human controller, i.e., the 
anaesthetist, who is responsible for the CVC task. He/she executes and controls (i.e., plays 
the role of the actuator) the CVC process (i.e., the controlled process) based on his/her 
experience (i.e., their mental model), in combination with data from the Operating 
Department Practitioner (ODP – i.e. the anaesthetist’s assistant) and his/her own senses 
(i.e., sensors). 
Due to space saving reasons, only indicative examples related to possible guidewire 
retention (from Steps 5 through to Step 9 of the STPA process) are presented here. Given 
that the responsibility of the anaesthetist (Step 5) is to perform the CVC process, in Step 6 
we defined (a) his/her control actions (CAs) and (b) the types of unsafe control actions 
(UCAs). Overall, the analysis led to 11 CAs and 21 UCAs in total. The final row of Table 1 
includes the most relevant CAs and UCAs for guidewire retention. However, as a matter of 
sequence, the CAs and associated UCAs that preceded these are given in the first row of 
Table 1. Appendix I includes all the CAs and UCAs involved in a possible accident of retained 
guidewire. 
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Table 1: Indicative results from STPA Step 6. 
Control 
Action 
Types of Unsafe Control Actions [UCA] 
1. Not Providing 
Causes Hazard 
2. Providing 
Causes Hazard 
3. Too Early/ Too 
Late/ Wrong Causes 
Hazard 
4. Stopping Too 
Soon/ Applying it 
Too Long Causes 
Hazard 
[CA8] Insert 
the catheter 
over the 
guidewire 
Not hazardous 
[UCA13] Insert 
the catheter 
over the 
guidewire 
provided when 
guidewire does 
not remain in 
place, i.e. it 
moves deeper 
inside the vein 
[UCA14] Insert the 
catheter over the 
guidewire provided 
wrongly, before the 
anaesthetist pinches 
the external tip of the 
guidewire 
[UCA15] Insert the 
catheter over the 
guidewire stopped 
too soon when the 
external tip of the 
guidewire is not 
reachable 
[CA9] 
Remove the 
guidewire 
[UCA16] Remove 
the guidewire not 
provided when 
catheter 
placement is 
completed 
Not hazardous 
[UCA17] Remove the 
guidewire provided 
too late, i.e. 
postoperative, when 
the patient has 
already undergone 
the surgery 
Not hazardous 
 
In STPA Step 7, we restated all UCAs as safety constraints. A useful way to do this is to add 
or remove a negation. [UCA16], for instance, can be translated into a safety requirement as 
follows: “The anaesthetist shall remove the guidewire when CVC process is completed”. 
Next, in Step 8, for every element of the control structure (Figure 3), we considered possible 
flaws that may contribute to the occurrence of [UCA16] and [UCA17] identified in Table 1. 
To define these flaws, the STPA hazard analysis offers guidance through the fixed 
guidewords given in Figure 1. Figure 1 was also used as a template to generate Figure 4 and 
the bullet points correspond to the guidewords of Figure 1. This step led to the causal 
factors (CF) of Figure 4. 
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Figure 4: Causal factors for [UCA16] and [UCA17]. 
 
In the final step, Step 9, flaws were translated into safety requirements. In a similar manner 
as previously, if a flaw (see Figure 4) is composed in the following way: “Central line pack 
design changes not reported beforehand”, the corresponding safety requirement, i.e. [SR3], 
could be expressed as shown in Table 2, row 3. Results in Table 2 refer to all the flaws 
identified by STPA for [UCA6] and [UCA7], and are translated into safety requirements. 
Table 2 also compares the STPA results to those obtained for the Bow-tie Analysis.  Each 
safety requirement was compared to the data obtained in the BTA, and whether they were: 
(a) identified by the BTA – “YES”, (b) not identified– “NO” or (c) implied – “MAYBE”. 
 
Table 2: Results from STPA Step 9. 
STPA results 
Figure 4 Bow-tie 
May 
relate to  
YES NO MAYBE 
[SR1] Anaesthetist shall receive simulation training under 
realistic and critical conditions before performing CVC 
CF1 
x   
[SR2] Anaesthetist shall be informed of changes about design 
changes in medical devices 
CF2; CF3 
x   
[SR3] Hospital management shall ensure that anaesthetists 
work in an environment where distractions/interruptions are 
minimised 
CF8; CF9; 
CF10 x   
[SR4] Anaesthetist shall consult another anaesthetist in case 
of not feeling well/confident 
CF11; 
CF13; 
CF14; 
CF15 
 x  
[SR5] Hospital management shall plan health checks for 
medics or build health checks into the annual medical 
revalidation procedure 
CF13 
 x  
[SR6] Hospital management shall encourage self-reporting of 
near-misses by anaesthetists 
CF11; 
CF13; 
CF14; 
CF15 
 x  
[SR7] Anaesthetist shall perform CAs with continuity and with 
the maximum possible concentration 
CF3; CF4; 
CF5 
  x 
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[SR8] Surgeon shall undertake his/her tasks only when 
anaesthetist stands off the patient 
CF6; CF8 
 x  
[SR9] A must-not-do list shall be given to trainee 
anaesthetists 
CF9 
 x  
[SR10] Potential complications of CVC shall be made clear to 
trainee doctors and medics in general, especially regarding 
retained guidewires 
CF1; CF7-
9; CF11; 
CF12; 
CF14; 
CF15 
 x  
[SR11] Sign on the door stating that anaesthetic is in progress 
shall be placed, or a traffic light system to the door shall be 
added, to warn those who want to enter the anaesthetic 
room / operating (not operation) theatre 
CF8; CF12 
  x 
[SR12] ODP/nurse/ anaesthetist shall brief incoming surgeon 
about the development of the process prior to the beginning 
of the surgical procedure  
CF10; 
CF12  x  
[SR13] Completion of CVC steps, including guidewire 
removal, shall be confirmed and acknowledged 
CF11-C15 
 x  
[SR14] ODP shall concentrate on the process; otherwise ask 
for replacement 
CF12 
x   
[SR15] ODP shall interrupt anaesthetist if guidewire removal 
omitted 
CF12; 
CF13- 
CF15 
 x  
[SR16] Removal of guidewire shall be announced audibly CF12; 
CF14; 
CF15 
   
[SR17] ODP and anaesthetist shall check if guidewire in tray 
before leaving the operation theatre 
CF12; 
CF14; 
CF15 
x   
 
4. Discussion: Comparison of the BTA and STPA Approaches 
It is important to note that a full one-by-one comparison of the results of the two analyses is 
not possible, due to the different nature and complexity of STPA and BTA. For example, 
examining the bow-tie diagram in Figure 2 allows for a match with the STPA safety 
requirements related to preventative and mitigating controls. In this way, the STPA safety 
requirements for guidewire retention can be categorised into preventative and mitigating 
requirements. Conversely, in Table 2, there are safety requirements not identified by the 
BTA; such as the ODP being encouraged to interrupt the anaesthetist if guidewire has not 
been removed.  
The research found that BTA provides an effective way of displaying and examining the 
contributing factors, consequences, and potential preventative and mitigating control 
measures or barriers associated with a guidewire-retention incident. So the main function of 
BTA can perhaps be viewed as an effective risk communication tool to link together 
guidewire retention events with their contributing factors, controls and consequences and 
to highlight both existing and missing/possible barriers. As such, it could be seen as a 
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prospective rather than merely reactive medical safety management tool (Kerckhoffs et al, 
2013).  
Similarly, the STPA results indicate that events leading to guidewire retention occur because 
safety constraints were not successfully implemented. That is, STPA, like BTA, is a 
prospective analysis tool that shifts the emphasis in system safety from preventing failures 
to making behavioural changes (Leveson, 2011), e.g. implementing safety requirements 
after a systemic analysis and considering the interactions between the system elements. 
Considering BTA in conjunction with STPA, the former gives an overview of what activities 
keep a control working. In turn, STPA reveals who is responsible for controls and the safety 
constraints that were not enforced by the controller, i.e. in this case the anaesthetist, and 
the appropriate control actions that are provided but are not followed. In other words, BTA 
gives the ‘big picture’, whilst STAMP guides the identification of scenarios that lead to 
hazardous control actions and violate the system component safety constraints. Given this 
notion, STPA could feed into the bow-tie to identify other contributing factors and controls 
for a revised bow-tie diagram. Such an approach could make a positive impact on improving 
the risk management systems of an organisation. For example, they could be used in 
dynamic risk assessment by means of updating the bow-tie (with STPA input) regularly in 
response to changing circumstances such as new equipment or procedures being 
introduced. 
Of course, care should be taken in extrapolating from the single topic explored in this paper 
to healthcare as a whole in terms of reliability and validity of the methods employed 
(Stanton et al, 2013). However, it is argued here that the combination of approaches 
presented in this paper might help push analysis of healthcare incidents and barriers a little 
further. In this direction, further work in combining the BTA and STPA approaches for other 
‘never-events’ in healthcare (e.g. wrong site surgery) is being considered, and the current 
work examining retained surgical instruments is receiving further input and validation from 
experienced anaesthetists. 
Other potential limitations include the guide words or “generic factors” (Leveson 2011) 
which are used in STPA to help locate safety hazards. These may restrict the analysis. For 
instance, they may limit the scope of the investigation and the potential of the analyst to 
significantly contribute to the richness of the study. Conversely, however, the guide words 
facilitate the identification of risk reduction measures, rather than simply adding 
redundancy or overdesigning in order to deal with component failures. For STPA, building 
the safety control structure, like the one in Figure 3, may be challenging for non-specialists, 
and requires a high level of system knowledge – an issue which has also been highlighted by 
Salmon et al, (2012). 
Pitblado and Weijand have also highlighted the risk that the quality of a BTA can be 
degraded by a lack of knowledge of how to apply it properly. If this occurs in industries that 
are already familiar with similar methods, this may be an even greater barrier to success in 
the context of healthcare. Healthcare is a sector which tends to use proactive assessment 
methods sparingly, relying more on retrospective accident analysis methods such as Root 
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Cause Analysis (RCA). It could be argued that RCA is a simpler method than BTA and STAMP, 
and yet the quality of many RCAs is still questionable (Trbovich & Shojania, 2017; Wu et al, 
2008), not least due to a lack of time to perform a comprehensive analysis (Braithwaite et al, 
2006). Thus, both types of analysis would require an experienced and multidisciplinary 
team, supported by adequate resources.  
In terms of reducing the risk of retained surgical instruments, the BTA identified a number 
of possible solutions. These include suggestions for reducing distractions, design solutions 
including using longer wires and designing a device which physically restricts the movement 
of the wire, and educating trainee anaesthetists about the risks of guidewire retention 
during CVC. Although potentially helpful, many of these ideas have been suggested in other 
publications (Horberry et al, 2014; Lum et al, 2005; Omar et al, 2010; Williams et al, 2014; 
Teng et al, 2014). 
The STPA analysis led to a range of possible solutions, many of which focus on wider issues 
such as modifying the working environment or the behaviour of clinicians, or adding 
administrative measures. Examples of these include installing access controls to the theatre, 
ensuring working space between the surgeon and the anaesthetist and alerting 
anaesthetists to any design changes. In general, these solutions are more novel than those 
suggested elsewhere, but may suffer from a range of challenges in terms of practical 
implementation. Furthermore, efforts to modify human behaviour may be well intended, 
but may also not be very effective (NIOSH, 2016) since they tend to address the symptom 
rather than the cause (Bagian, 2012). As such, validation of STPA analysis by Subject Matter 
Experts such as experienced anaesthetists is an important step before moving to practical 
implementation of the solutions generated. 
5. Conclusions 
The main conclusion of this paper is that BTA and STPA can complement each other. It is 
useful, for example, to have the bow-tie diagram in place, before starting to apply STPA, 
because it can give the analyst an insight of what to expect, and look for, in the later stages 
of the STPA analysis. This is mainly useful in cases where the analyst is not experienced 
enough to apply STPA. Due to its pictorial form, BTA offers an overview of the points where 
the analyst should pay more attention. This could help to focus the STPA, which is quite a 
lengthy process, and might save a substantial amount of analysis time as a result. Bow-tie 
diagrams could therefore have a supportive role towards STPA: this may result in a more 
robust analysis methodology through the integration of the two techniques and subsequent 
validation by Subject Matter Experts such as experienced anaesthetists. 
Both the BTA and STPA methods produced a set of solutions to the guidewire retention 
issue, each solution varying in its novelty, ease of implementation and effectiveness. It is 
likely that utilising multiple solutions, preferably in an integrated approach that also involves 
end-user input, will be most effective in reducing the risk of retained guidewires.  
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Appendix I 
Control Action [CA] / 
Controller [C] 
Types of Unsafe Control Actions [UCA] 
1. Not Providing Causes 
Hazard 
2. Providing Causes 
Hazard 
3. Too Early/ Too Late/ Wrong 
Causes Hazard 
4. Stopping Too Soon/ Applying 
it Too Long Causes Hazard 
[C1] Anaesthetist 
[CA1] Insert the 
needle to gain access 
to the target vein 
Not hazardous 
N/A for the specific 
hazard 
N/A for the specific hazard N/A for the specific hazard 
[CA2] Insert the 
guidewire 
Not hazardous 
N/A for the specific 
hazard 
N/A for the specific hazard 
[UCA1] Insert the guidewire 
provided too long, situated too 
deeply in the vein 
[CA3] Remove the 
needle 
N/A for the specific hazard Not hazardous N/A for the specific hazard N/A for the specific hazard 
[CA4] Make a nick in 
the skin 
Not hazardous 
N/A for the specific 
hazard 
N/A for the specific hazard N/A for the specific hazard 
[CA5] Insert the 
dilator over the 
guidewire 
[UCA2] Insert the dilator over 
the guidewire not provided 
when the nick is not too wide 
[UCA3] Insert the dilator 
over the guidewire 
provided when dilator 
and guidewire move in at 
the same time 
[UCA4] Insert the dilator over the 
guidewire provided wrongly, before 
the anaesthetist pinches the 
external tip of the guidewire 
 
[UCA5] Insert the dilator over 
the guidewire stopped too soon 
when the external tip of the 
guidewire is not reachable 
[UCA6] Insert the dilator over 
the guidewire provided too long 
when the guidewire is not visible 
externally 
[CA6] Push the [UCA7] Push the dilator into [UCA8] Push dilator into [UCA9] Push dilator into skin and [UCA10] Push the dilator into 
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dilator into the skin 
and the vein 
the skin and the vein not 
provided when the guidewire 
is not visible externally 
skin and vein provided 
when it moves in at same 
time with the guidewire 
the vein provided wrongly, before 
the anaesthetist makes sure that 
the guidewire is visible externally 
the skin and the vein provided 
too long when the guidewire is 
not visible externally 
[CA7] Remove the 
dilator 
Not hazardous 
[UCA11] Remove the 
dilator provided when the 
anaesthetist does not 
pinch the external tip of 
the guidewire 
[UCA12] Remove the dilator 
provided too early before the 
anaesthetist pinches the external 
tip of the guidewire 
Not hazardous 
[CA8] Insert the 
catheter over the 
guidewire 
Not hazardous 
[UCA13] Insert catheter 
over guidewire provided 
when guidewire does not 
remain in place, i.e. 
moves deeper inside vein 
[UCA14] Insert the catheter over 
the guidewire provided wrongly, 
before the anaesthetist pinches the 
external tip of the guidewire 
[UCA15] Insert the catheter over 
the guidewire stopped too soon 
when the external tip of the 
guidewire is not reachable 
[CA9] Remove the 
guidewire 
[UCA16] Remove the 
guidewire not provided when 
catheter placement is 
completed 
Not hazardous 
[UCA17] Remove the guidewire 
provided too late, i.e. 
postoperative, when the patient 
has already undergone the surgery 
Not hazardous 
[CA10] Place the 
guidewire in the tray 
[UCA18] Place the guidewire 
in the tray not provided when 
CVC process is completed; i.e. 
no way to check whether the 
guidewire was removed from 
patient or not 
Not hazardous 
[UCA19] Place the guidewire in the 
tray provided too late when 
surgeon takes over 
Not hazardous 
[UCA20] Place the guidewire in tray 
provided too late i.e., when patient 
has undergone surgery 
[CA11] Secure the 
catheter in the skin 
N/A for the specific hazard Not hazardous 
[UCA21] Secure catheter in skin 
provided too early before checking 
whether guidewire is removed 
Not hazardous 
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